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I' 
DIVINE ACTION IN A WORLD CHAOS: 
AN EVALUATION OF JOHN POLKINGHORNE'S 
MODEL OF SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION 
Steven D. Crain 
John Polkinghorne, formerly a physicist and now an Anglican priest and 
theologian, has made a significant contribution to the current dialogue 
between Christian theology and the natural sciences. I examine here his 
reflection on what is commonly called the problem of special divine action 
in the world. Polkinghorne argues that God acts in the world via a "top-
down" or "downward" mode of causation that exploits the indeterministic 
openness of chaotic systems without requiring that God violate natural 
laws. In response, I argue: (1) that divine intervention in response to human 
sin is theologically, as well as scientifically unobjectionable; and (2) that the 
belief that God is the transcendent creator of the world renders the "causal 
joint" between God and the world metaphysical in nature, thus obviating 
the need to uncover a physical feature of the world that God exploits in 
order to act in the world. 
John Polkinghorne is one of many scientists contributing to a growing 
body of literature that explores the interrelationships between science 
and Christian theology. After retiring from professional activity as a 
mathematical physicist, he sought ordination in the Church of England, 
whereupon he served as vicar of a country parish for some years before 
returning to an academic setting. Now, as President of Queens' College, 
Cambridge, he devotes much energy to his work on theology and science 
in books and papers that span the whole range of metaphysical and epis-
temological issues central to the current dialogue. Broadly speaking, he is 
trying to construct a new natural theology, one informed by contempo-
rary science that demonstrates the consistency and coherence between 
the practice and findings of the natural sciences and "the substance of 
Christian orthodoxy."! One particular topic on which he has labored is 
the subject of divine action in the world. Drawing on recent work in 
chaos theory, Polkinghorne explores how the belief that God acts within 
the created order might be conceived in a way acceptable to the scientific 
mind, which, he argues, resists the notion that the laws of nature would 
ever be suspended or violated, and acceptable as well to the theologian 
concerned to elaborate an adequate concept of the freedom of creation. 
My paper evaluates some key aspects of Polkinghorne's work on divine 
action. The reader will discover that he addresses many questions of 
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interest to the philosophical theologian and philosopher of science.2 
Polkinghorne's arguments concerning divine action can be analyzed 
as follows: 
(1) God performs particular acts within the created order. 
That is, in addition to the comprehensive act of creation and 
conservation, God is "specially active" in the world, responding, 
for example, to the needs of personal beings expressed in prayer. 
(2) God performs these particular acts without interfering 
with the operation of natural laws, i.e., without performing mira-
cles, a notion with which the scientific mind is uncomfortable, 
but, more importantly, to which there are important theological 
objections. 
(3) God's special activity must be understood so as to avoid 
committing the religious believer to what is typically known as 
the "God of the gaps." This means that God's special activity 
must not be located in "gaps" in the contemporary scientific 
account of the world. For history suggests that such gaps 
inevitably close with the progress of science. 
(4) In virtue of satisfying the preceding criteria, a promising 
model of special divine action holds that God acts in the world via 
a "top-down" or "downward" mode of causation that exploits the 
indeterministic openness of complex dynamical systems. 
In the following I will examine and then evaluate these arguments. I will 
proceed by developing each of the preceding four points and then offer 
extensive critical commentary. 
I 
According to Polkinghorne, to deny special divine activity would 
strike at the heart of the Christian conviction that God is "personal." A 
personal God freely responds to individual personal need, thereby evok-
ing a free response in turn on the part of human beings.3 The divine 
response can take many forms: calling, convicting, healing, reproving, 
consoling, forgiving, demanding, inviting. God's action - if discerned -
can in turn evoke gratitude, puzzlement, praise, anger, hope, contrition, 
sorrow, joy. The objects evoking these responses are events or sequences 
of events interpreted as meaningful, i.e., as bearing the impress of divine 
purpose for the ongoing relationship between God and human beings. 
Hence, the belief that events fall out one way and not another at least in 
part because God has freely acted in one way as opposed to another is 
essential to the daily living out of the Christian faith. Moreover, in its 
doctrinal structure, Christianity is supremely a religion dependent on 
the claim that God is active in the world. For at the heart of the Christian 
faith lies the fundamental divine "act" upon which hinges the salvation 
of the world, namely, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Therefore, any model of divine activity that limits God's 
action merely to creating the universe and conserving it in being, such as 
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Maurice Wiles' model of creation as a single, complex divine act, must 
be rejected as incompatible with Christian faith and practice.4 
II 
Polkinghorne grants that in order to respond to the individual needs 
of creatures, God possesses the power to interfere with the operation of 
natural laws - to perform miracles in the traditional sense - but argues 
that it is unfitting for God to use such power when acting within the cre-
ated order. For as creator, God upholds the laws of nature in the first 
place: they are an expression of the divine will. If God proceeds to sus-
pend or otherwise interfere with the operation of these laws, then, 
Polkinghorne contends, God would be acting contrary to God's own 
will, in a sense undoing an aspect of creation in an attempt to "fix" what 
God could not "get right" in the first place. Moreover, a God whose spe-
cial activity is thus sporadic or intermittent would be inconsistent and 
undependable. Such a God could not be depended on to act in a ratio-
nally coherent way, but would rather resemble a magician or conjurer 
performing tricks at whim. Indeed, the theologian who argues that God 
interferes with natural laws must then confront an especially difficult 
form of the problem of evil: why does God not violate the laws of nature 
more often in order to alleviate the suffering of creatures? For a God 
who acts sporadically comes to the rescue of some while unaccountably 
withholding divine help from others. Polkinghorne rejects such a picture 
of divine action. God's action must rather be conceived as continuous 
and wholly rational, as befits the unconditional trust the believer 
bestows on God. The laws of nature are therefore inviolable.' 
According to Polkinghorne, in this way the reliable operation of nat-
ural laws reflects the faithfulness of God. But the inviolability of natural 
law expresses divine faithfulness in another sense as well. God is faith-
ful, not only in acting consistently, but also in granting to all creation 
that degree of autonomy befitting a "partner" with which God freely 
relates. That is, in an important sense, freedom characterizes God's rela-
tionship to all creation insofar as the universe as a whole exists as God's 
partner in a free relationship. In this context, by "freedom" 
Polkinghorne means the freedom of all created being - of the universe in 
its entirety - to be itself, to be what God has created it to be. Since the 
natures of created things are at least in part defined by the laws which 
govern their interrelationships, to interfere with the operation of these 
laws - to overrule, in other words, what helps make the entire order of 
created things what it is - therefore violates the freedom of creation.6 In 
sum then, from a theological perspective, one is as strongly motivated to 
deny that God interferes with natural laws as to assert that God per-
forms particular acts within the created order. Hence, although as a sci-
entist, Polkinghorne shares the basic intuition of the "scientific mind" 
that the laws of nature operate without fail in all circumstances, his 
rejection of miracles in the traditional sense does not follow from slavish 
adherence to the intellectual spirit of the age, but from fundamental the-
ological convictions. 
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III 
According to Polkinghorne, therefore, the contemporary Christian 
theologian must chart a course between a "deistic" rejection of special 
divine action, and the equally unacceptable affirmation that God inter-
feres with natural laws. Moreover, in so doing, the theologian must not 
repeat an error especially common in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, when God was conceived to act in the world precisely in those 
contexts where explanations in terms of natural laws were thought 
unlikely or impossible. 
Charles Darwin is credited with undermining a widely popular ver-
sion of this natural theology in the nineteenth century: the notion that 
evidence for special acts of divine creation can be found in the mar-
velous diversity of living things and in the exquisite adaptation of 
organisms to their environment. For Darwin offered a plausible account 
- or at least the core of such an account - that explains how nature herself 
could produce such tremendous diversity among living things so won-
derfully adapted. That is, he argued that the laws of nature alone can 
account for biological diversity and fitness, without need for particular 
divine activity in the form of special creation. What had been considered 
a "gap" in the scientific account of the world was now "filled." 
Moreover, in the wake of the Origin of Species, a consensus developed 
that Darwin had undermined the entire approach to natural theology 
whereby one attempts to locate God's special activity within such 
"gaps" in the scientific account of the world. 
Polkinghorne approves of the downfall of the "God of the gaps," for 
as the Darwin episode dramatically illustrates, the God-of-the-gaps nat-
ural theology is inherently unstable, since in order to prevail it depends 
on certain scientific advances not being made. The practice of science and 
the conviction that God acts in the world therefore collide, with the result 
that when the relevant scientific advances do happen, they then appear 
to send the believer into retreat before the steady progress of science. The 
"God of the gaps" is thus, so to speak, "squeezed" out of the world, and 
faith in God's ability, or willingness, to act in the world is undermined. 
Hence, Polkinghorne argues that no acceptable conception of special 
divine activity ought to depend on temporary scientific ignorance.7 
To summarize, then, Polkinghorne's position on divine action to this 
point: God performs particular acts within the created order without 
violating natural laws and without operating under cover, so to speak, 
of phenomena for which scientists only temporarily lack explanations in 
terms of natural laws. Polkinghorne exploits recent developments in the 
new physics, specifically in the study of complex dynamical systems 
("chaos" theory), in order to develop his model of divine action. 
IV 
Polkinghorne argues that special divine activity would violate the 
integrity of creation if the world were a deterministic mechanism gov-
erned by the laws of classical physics. For in order for God to act in a 
Newtonian world, God would have to break or suspend the operation of 
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natural laws. Polkinghorne views the Newtonian world as a "closed" 
and "rigid" structure wherein at any given time all events are pre-deter-
mined to occur by the laws of nature and the state of the universe at any 
given time in the past. The Newtonian world is therefore not "open" to 
special divine activity of a non-invasive sort - for any such activity 
would entail God's tampering with some deterministic law or laws in 
order to bring about what otherwise would not have occurred had this 
law or these laws been in force. 
However, Polkinghorne argues that the "new physics" has over-
thrown the deterministic, mechanistic Newtonian worldview. The world 
is no longer seen to be a rigid, closed structure. The world is open, for 
the past does not rigorously determine the future, since at any time "t," 
any number of possible futures are compatible with the state of the uni-
verse and its laws. Why? Because we now know that a significant num-
ber of natural laws are indeterministic, namely, in the micro-realm, the 
laws of quantum mechanics, and in the macro-realm, the newly-discov-
ered laws of chaotic systems.s Polkinghorne suggests that God exploits 
this openness, especially in the macro-realm - the realm of our experi-
ence - in order to act providentially in the world.9 
How does God exploit indeterminism, especially of a macroscopic 
variety, in order to act in the world? In brief, Polkinghorne argues that 
"downwardly" acting causal powers can "emerge" in indeterministic 
systems - especially those studied by the new science of "chaos" - and 
that in virtue of this possibility, an indeterministic world is open to non-
interventive divine action. A few words of explanation are in order, 
although Polkinghorne himself admits that his thoughts here are meant 
to be suggestive of a fruitful direction in which to look for light on the 
problem of divine action, rather than a model worked out in comprehen-
sive detail. 
An "emergent" of a system is a power or property obtaining at the 
level of the whole whose operation cannot be fully explained in terms of 
the powers or properties of the system's constituents. That is, an emer-
gent power or property is "wholistic" - it cannot be "reduced to" the 
powers or properties of the system's parts. For example, one can claim 
that powers or properties obtaining at the level of the brain-as-a-whole 
are irreducible to the powers or properties of its constituent neurons. 
"Downward causality" is an example of an emergent power, one emerg-
ing in certain complex "chaotic" - and therefore indeterministic - sys-
tems. A downwardly-active causal power is an irreducible power that a 
system-as-a-whole has to influence the states of that system's parts by 
exploiting the indeterminism obtaining on the lower ontological level of 
the system. It is therefore as if the system considered as a whole is a 
causal entity impinging on the system's parts, such that the causal con-
tribution of the system-as-a-whole must be taken into account just as are 
the causal contributions of external entities and the causal interactions 
governed by the indeterministic laws holding on the level of the parts. 
Polkinghorne conceives of this wholistic causal contribution in terms of 
a "top-down" non-energetic "input" of "information" that determines 
on the lower level what the laws obtaining on this level otherwise leave 
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undetermined. The system considered as a whole thereby "selects" for 
the system one from among many of the evolutionary paths allowed by 
the applicable indeterministic laws.1O 
The relationship obtaining between an emergent, wholistic, down-
wardly-active causal power and the laws governing a system's parts 
provides the key component of Polkinghorne's model for non-interven-
tive divine action in the world. For a wholistic causal power, because it 
acts non-energetically on (and therefore under cover of, so to speak) the 
indeterministic processes at a system's lower ontological levels, influ-
ences the behavior of the system's parts without violating the laws gov-
erning the behavior of the parts. Hence, the downwardly active causal 
power acts on the system's constituents with a degree of autonomy, yet 
without in any way interrupting the laws governing the behavior of the 
parts. In sum, such a causal power acts non-invasively to affect the 
states of the system's constituents. In view of this, Polkinghorne sug-
gests that God acts downwardly in the world by exploiting and thereby 
working "under cover of" the indeterministic openness obtaining 
throughout the world's various ontologicallevels." 
The model gains credibility, he suggests, by considering that free 
human action may well depend on our exploiting indeterministic· 
dynamical systems in our own bodies. In other words, that we can act 
freely in the world suggests how God can act freely as well. For if one 
rejects various dualistic solutions to the mind-body problem, as 
Polkinghorne does, then one must look for ways in which human agents 
can escape being trapped, as it were, by chains of causality in the natural 
world that would otherwise determine human actions. Hence, 
Polkinghorne speculates, by exploiting indeterminism in the world, both 
divine and human agents find means for acting freely in a world gov-
erned by naturallaws.12 Although God is thus conceived to act in the 
indeterministic "gaps" of the world, Polkinghorne argues that he is not 
thereby committing himself to the "God of the gaps" of nineteenth-cen-
tury natural theology, for the gaps in and through which free action 
occurs are built into the world itself: they are not products of temporary 
scientific ignorance. 
Polkinghorne uses his model to address the problem of evil: God's 
activity is constrained in that the world's openness allows limited room 
for divine maneuver, a limitation that God must respect in order to 
respect the freedom and integrity of creation. To see this, consider the 
analogous case of the brain interacting with its own neurons. The state-
of-the-brain-as-a-whole cannot cause its neurons to assume just any set 
of neuronal states at a time lit." Presumably, what neuronal states are 
accessible depends on the neuronal states at time lit-I," as well as on the 
state-of-the-brain-as-a-whole at "t-l," as well as on the states of any 
intervening subsystems between the wholistic state and the brain's neu-
rons (i.e., the states of any emergent sub-systems). Hence, by extension, 
one can envision numerous constraints on God's downward activity in 
the world: not just any state of affairs can be brought about at time "t." 
Hence, God cannot prevent or otherwise influence every evil if God is 
constrained to act via downward causation. 
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This, then, in rough outline, is Polkinghorne's analysis of the problem 
of divine action and his proposed model, a model which, again, he him-
self admits is not a proposal worked out in fine detail. He does include 
enough detail, however, to warrant careful study, for in constructing his 
model he raises a number of important issues that any study of divine 
action must address, many of which concern his basic motivation for 
designing the model along the lines that he has. I begin my evaluation, 
then, not by examining the model itself, but by taking up one of these 
preliminary issues, namely, the topic of the "God of the gaps." As we 
have seen, one of Polkinghorne's major concerns has been to understand 
how God acts in the world without becoming in the process a "God of 
the gaps." I will argue for an alternative way of thinking about the rela-
tionship between special divine activity and the practice of science than 
that Polkinghorne has proposed. 
As we have seen, Polkinghorne rejects both the traditional concept of 
miracle and the God of the gaps. Although he does not, to my knowl-
edge, argue that these notions stand or fall together, it will prove helpful 
to ask whether and how one might affirm that God occasionally inter-
feres with the operation of natural laws in response to personal need, and 
yet still deny that God's special activity should be located within gaps in 
the scientific account of the world. For on the one hand, I agree with 
Polkinghorne that theologians ought eschew the God of the gaps, yet I 
also argue that a Christian seeking to adhere to the "substance of 
Christian orthodoxy" is strongly motivated to find acceptable the tradi-
tional notion of miracle, since the miracle central to the Christian gospel, 
the resurrection of Jesus, at least prima facie appears to involve interfer-
ence with natural laws. (Polkinghorne, I hasten to add, affirms the bodily 
resurrection of Christ, but in the context of an alternative understanding 
of this and other miracles.13) I will respond to Polkinghorne's theological 
objections to miracles conceived as violations of natural law later. For 
now, I will seek to justify my claim that, at least with respect to the prac-
tice of science, one can consistently affirm the traditional concept of mira-
cle and still reject the God of the gaps, once, that is, the latter is properly 
understood. The comments that follow will be seen to have implications 
for Polkinghorne's overall approach to special divine action. 
My argument is as follows. One can call a single event "miraculous" 
without pitting the practice of science against one's conviction that God 
is specially active in the world. This is so because, with one important 
exception to be considered below, the practice of science does not 
require that every event be scientifically explicable, i.e., explicable in 
terms of the operation of natural laws. Consider the belief that a patient 
has miraculously recovered from an illness, i.e., recovered in such a 
way that religious believers argue no scientific explanation for the recov-
ery is possible. Although one can demand that, in principle, the "scien-
tific account of the world" must include explanations for all events -
including apparently miraculous ones - one cannot do so on empirical 
grounds. By this I mean that the actual practice of a science like medi-
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cine only demands that a given class of phenomena be explicable in 
terms of natural laws. For scientists seek answers to questions that are 
general in scope, questions like the following: What causes continental 
drift? How do stars generate their energy? Why does a certain drug slow 
the growth of pancreatic tumors? With an important exception to be 
considered below, it is in addressing questions of this kind that science 
constructs its account of the world, what I am calling "the scientific 
account of the world." When sciences like medicine encounter events 
that religious believers claim are miraculous, they can, and do, write off 
such events as simply anomalous (if not necessarily miraculous) without 
having to seek an explanation for the event in terms of natural laws: the 
profession can simply, as it were, move on without violating its method-
ological canons. It is thus incumbent on scientists to recognize that only 
on non-empirical grounds, for example, on the basis of a materialist 
metaphysic, can one demand that science in principle must explain all 
events. Of course, an event thought to be miraculous can, on reconsider-
ation, turn out to be scientifically explicable after all, perhaps in terms of 
a newly discovered natural law, and when this happens, religious 
believers are required to retract their claims that a miracle has occurred. 
I will return to this possibility momentarily. But the practice of science 
does not demand that, in principle, all claims about the miraculous be 
explained away in this manner. 
The practice of science is compatible with single events going unex-
plained scientifically, be they, for example, miraculous healings, or 
indeed even resurrections from the dead, because a universe whose nat-
ural laws are only occasionally interrupted still in general exhibits law-
like behavior, so that general classes of phenomena remain open to sci-
entific investigation. Indeed, from a theological perspective, this is sim-
ply to affirm that for the most part, natural laws operate without fail, 
except on those rare occasions when God interferes with that operation. 
For this reason, in order to avoid conflict with science, religious believ-
ers ought limit their claims about special divine action to isolated single 
events. To rely on special divine action to address questions of general 
scope, i.e., to account for classes of phenomena (like stellar energy pro-
duction) necessarily commits one to the God of the gaps, because it is 
precisely by answering such questions in terms of natural laws that sci-
ence builds its account of the world. On the other hand, to claim that 
God has intervened on isolated single occasions does not, on my use of 
the term "the God of the gaps," necessarily commit a religious believer 
to the belief that a "gap" exists in the scientific account of the world 
within which God is specially active. (It might: I will try to resolve this 
question later.) For the same reason, if forced to revise her claims about, 
for example, a putative miraculous healing because of a new discovery, 
it would be improper to say that a "gap" in the scientific account of the 
world has been closed, forcing the believer to "retreat" before scientific 
progress. Claims about the miraculous will necessarily have this unto-
ward effect only from the perspective of a materialist or naturalistic 
metaphysic that rules out the miraculous in principle. 
Hence, on this account, one way to explain how nineteenth-century 
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natural theology erred would be to say that it posited special divine 
action as the answer to what, in virtue of its generality, was properly a 
scientific question, namely the question, Why are living organisms so 
diverse and wonderfully adapted to their environments? In this case, 
unlike that where a particular healing is called miraculous, religious 
believers did indeed contend that a "gap" existed in the scientific 
account of the world, and therefore inevitably they come into conflict 
with science and eventually "retreated" before its progress. One could 
then argue that if in the nineteenth century proponents of special divine 
creation had limited their claims to isolated, occasional events of divine 
intervention, rather than trying to explain the entire general shape of the 
biological world in terms of special divine activity, we would not accuse 
them of having committed themselves to the God of the gaps. 
To this last possibility, however, evolutionary biologists today would 
object. For my argument to this point had depended on claiming that 
science ultimately addresses questions of general scope, rather than 
seeking explanations of, or involving, single events. Evolutionary biolo-
gy, however, represents an important exception to this claim that must 
now be considered. For it, and other sciences, like cosmology, that 
reconstruct cosmic history often seek explanations of or involving single 
events. For example, cosmologists working with the big-bang model 
seek to understand the event or events that led to the breakdown of vari-
ous symmetries in the early universe, such as that between matter and 
anti-matter. Sciences like cosmology might be called "historical," not 
because they treat human history, but because they employ explanations 
that are "historical" in form, i.e., their explanations are essentially narra-
tives that make reference to natural laws. As a result, the "historical" sci-
ences inevitably engage in conflict with religious believers over explana-
tions involving single isolated events. 
For example, consider the possibility, as many biologists do, that life 
on earth began with a complex biochemical reaction occurring at a given 
time in a given location, although to date science has failed to offer a 
compelling, detailed account for the origin of life. In this case, one could 
argue, and indeed some have, that God interfered with natural laws in 
order to cause this - but only this - single event, and thereby to bring into 
being the first living organism. Evolutionary biology today cannot toler-
ate such a claim, for its method is to seek explanations for the origin and 
development of life exclusively in terms of natural laws. Hence, although 
in this case the religious believer has attributed only a single, isolated 
event to special divine action, open conflict with science inevitably 
results that looks all the world like an argument over a putative "gap" in 
the scientific account of the world. In this case, one could amend my pre-
vious discussion and add that where "historical" sciences such as evolu-
tionary biology or cosmology are concerned, any claims about miraculous 
intervention, even if involving only single events, commit religious 
believers to the God of the gaps, and therefore must be avoided. 
An alternative response is possible, however. One could argue that 
the situation just envisioned is simply analogous to the case of a miracu-
lous healing, and therefore no more objectionable with respect to the 
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practice of science than that case proved to be. Hence, even if God did 
miraculously create the first living organism, evolutionary biologists 
could still go about doing science. For once again, a single event's slip-
ping through the grasp of science - even one as crucial as the origin of 
life - would not render the universe a chaotic jumble impenetrable to 
human reason. Biologists in this case would still have much work to do 
investigating the evolution of life, just as medical science would contin-
ue to experiment with cancer drugs even if it reached a consensus that a 
certain patient had miraculously recovered from pancreatic cancer. On 
the other hand, if the believer were mistaken and life's origin could be 
scientifically explained, then the believer need not cower before the 
advance of science, as if science were "squeezing" God and divine activ-
ity from the world. It would simply become necessary for the believer to 
revise her beliefs regarding God's special responsibility for the single 
event in question. Hence, if conflict between science and theology results 
over the origin of life, it is no more harmful to religious belief than con-
flict over the explanation of a mysterious healing. Postulating miracu-
lous divine interventions in cosmic history only wreaks havoc for reli-
gious belief when these interventions are conceived to occur on a wide 
scale, as was the case in the Darwin episode, and therefore only in such 
instances ought the pejorative phrase "God of the gaps" find applica-
tion, if, in light of this discussion, it still remains a useful term at all. 
The preceding response is, I believe, quite rational. Short of rejecting 
any kind of divine interference with natural laws, as Polkinghorne does, 
this response allows the theologian to apply consistently the rule devel-
oped earlier: to avoid commitment to the God of the gaps, attribute only 
isolated single events to miraculous intervention. Yet, however the 
Christian might perceive the situation, the community of evolutionary 
biologists, for example, objects to any defense for the notion that God 
miraculously created earth's first life form. For, again, evolutionary biol-
ogists investigating the origins of life seek to reconstruct the history of 
life in terms of the relevant natural laws. Those scientists who reject this 
presupposition cannot get their work published in reputable journals; 
they are ostracized by their scientific community. 
Religious believers ought to ask whether they should follow biolo-
gists in responding this way to the idea of miraculous interventions in 
the history of life, and if so what theological justification they might 
have for affirming on the one hand that sciences like cosmology and 
evolutionary biology, which reconstruct cosmic history, legitimately 
reject the possibility of miraculous divine action in that history, and for 
affirming, on the other, that God might miraculously intervene in the 
affairs of human beings. Recall that Polkinghorne finds miracles theo-
logically objectionable because they imply that God returns to the scene 
of creation, so to speak, in order to "fix" it, and indeed doing so by 
seemingly contradicting the very divine intention responsible for the 
existence of the relevant natural laws in the first place. Moreover, he 
argues that miraculous interventions violate the freedom of creation to 
be what God created it to be, which is, I believe, to say that miracles vio-
late the integrity of the natural order, an integrity that depends on the 
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uniform operation of natural laws. Finally, he argues that the problem of 
evil becomes especially difficult for those who believe that God inter-
feres with natural laws: why does God not intervene more often? A God 
who intervenes miraculously in human history appears capricious and 
undependable. I will now respond to these arguments (delaying for the 
moment discussion of the problem of evil) in order in turn to argue that 
claims about miraculous interventions of the sort that evolutionary biol-
ogists reject are likewise theologically suspect, but that claims about 
miraculous interventions on behalf of human beings are not only scien-
tifically tolerable, but theologically acceptable as well. 
r take up first the notion of the integrity and freedom of creation and 
ask, Does creation's freedom and integrity, as Polkinghorne suggests, 
consist primarily in God's not interfering with the operation of natural 
laws? And secondly, would such interference constitute both an internal 
inconsistency within the divine will and a divine return to the scene of 
creation, as it were, to repair what might have been created properly in 
the first place? First, it must be recognized that neither Polkinghorne nor 
I claim to have unique insight into the divine will, as if it were open to 
scientific or philosophical investigation. All arguments here depend on 
our halting and quite fallible sense of what is "fitting," given what we 
do know of God and the world. Second, I remind the reader that 
Polkinghorne does not deny that God acts in special ways in the world, 
even in ways that deserve to be called miraculous. What he questions is 
whether in so doing, God ever interferes with natural laws. 
My basic response to Polkinghorne's arguments depends on distin-
guishing between two contexts in cosmic history, one involving the exis-
tence of personal beings, the other not.14 Where personal beings are 
absent, I argue that it is fitting for God to refrain from interfering with 
natural laws, but where they are present, it seems theologically justifi-
able that God might so interfere. The difference turns on how creation's 
freedom and integrity ought be understood in the two different contexts. 
In the context of personal beings, I argue that miraculous interference 
with natural laws would not violate the freedom and integrity of cre-
ation, whereas in a context where personal beings are not present, mira-
cles so understood would not seem appropriate. 
I begin by reflecting briefly on the notion of miracle itself. Of course, 
Scripture is neutral on the metaphysical status of miracles, whether they 
constitute interference with natural laws or not, not least because the 
concept "law of nature" is, technically, a creation of the scientific revolu-
tion. But beginning with the Old Testament and continuing on into the 
New and into the early Church, miracles perform two different func-
tions. First, a miracle represents a crux, a "wonder" -inspiring turning 
point in the course of events: but for the miracle, things would have 
turned out otherwise in some significant way. Second, a miraculous 
event follows from God's desire and intent that an unfolding story take 
this unexpected turn. As such, a miracle, already having inspired won-
der, then demands to be interpreted in terms of God's intentions. 
Miracles thus functions as "signs" to be read, as the Gospel of John 
specifically refers to the miracles of Jesus. Miracles thereby become spe-
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cial vehicles of God's personal communion with human beings. 
Consider, then, the question whether miraculous interference with 
natural laws would be appropriate in contexts not involving human 
beings, say during the early history of our planet just prior to the origin 
of life. I argue that in this context, miracles are not fitting because they 
cannot fulfill what one might call their "sign" function in a context where 
no personal beings are present to witness them and interpret their mean-
ing. Although one might claim that God expects personal beings to inter-
pret miraculous events in retrospect, this would presuppose that they 
could discover such events in the first place. But given that an event like 
the miraculous origin of life could only be "seen," as it were, as a single, 
isolated lacuna in the scientific account of the world, its discovery would 
be difficult and controversial, indeed far more controversial than claims 
that, for example, witnesses had encountered a man risen from the dead. 
One can still inquire, however, whether it would be fitting for miracu-
lous intervention to serve at least the first function, that of providing a 
turning point in cosmic history - whether discoverable or not - in, for 
example, causing life to begin where otherwise it would not have. This is 
equivalent to asking whether God might fail to build into cosmic 
processes the potential to produce life apart from such interference, or 
whether even if God did provide such potential, God would still miracu-
lously interfere with cosmic process on a given particular occasion. God 
might do so in order to guarantee that life develop despite the unfolding 
of a sequence of events that threatens to frustrate the in-built potential 
for life, or in order to guarantee that life develop at a particular time and 
place where otherwise it would not have. 
In this particular context, where as yet no personal beings exist, I do 
indeed agree with Polkinghorne that miraculous intervention seems 
unfitting. For in such a context, God can accomplish the divine will by 
means of natural laws without confronting self-conscious rebellion 
against the purposes of the creator. Atoms cannot so rebel, nor can 
galaxies, nor complex organic molecules, nor again arational living 
organisms. Of course, possessing distinct natures, different entities 
respond in diverse ways to the forces God's creative act sets at work, 
and therefore God's purposes can neither be executed instantaneously, 
nor even in what might be called" a straight line." Galaxies are 
destroyed, species go extinct, and apparently promising lines of devel-
opment come to a halt. But not needing to respond to sinful rebellion, 
there seems no compelling reason for God to interfere miraculously with 
the course of events. I say this because I accept Polkinghorne's argu-
ments concerning the freedom and integrity of creation to a point, name-
ly, that, all other things being equal, God shows love and respect for the 
God-given natures and causal powers of created things by not miracu-
lously intervening in cosmic processes, and therefore by working 
patiently, as it were, within the limitations of the materials chosen. In 
this context, then, I agree that it is fitting for God to demonstrate respect 
for the "freedom and integrity" of creation by not interfering with the 
operation of natural laws. The long, complex unfolding of cosmic histo-
ry that science has uncovered gives powerful witness to this divine 
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respect for creation's freedom and integrity. 
Once, however, rational beings enter the scene of cosmic history, 
then, I argue, the means by which God respects the freedom and integri-
ty of creation necessarily changes. For at this point, it finally becomes 
possible not only for creation to relate to its creator self-consciously and 
therefore personally, but also for it self-consciously to rebel against the 
creator's purposes. Whereas in the previous context I argued that God 
respects creation's freedom and integrity precisely by not interfering 
with natural laws, in this new context creation's freedom and integrity 
depend on God's responding appropriately to agents possessing moral 
responsibility who can and do abuse this gift. At minimum, God's 
response must not undermine the moral responsibility of free creatures. 
But what can be said about the status of natural laws in this context? 
Must they still be viewed as inviolable? 
One could argue that a miraculous act would violate creation's free-
dom and integrity just as much in this new context as in the old and for 
the same reason, namely, by interfering with the operation of God-given 
causal powers of created things and therefore violating that degree of 
autonomy befitting God's created "other." I argue, however, otherwise. 
For here, in this new context, the "integrity" of creation refers not simply 
to its relative autonomy from God, as required for it to be God's partner, 
but also, and more importantly, to the "wholeness" that creation is 
intended to achieve when it attains its divinely-intended end. That is, 
the integrity of creation ultimately depends on creation's reaching its 
final goal: consummation in a "face-to-face" personal relationship, to 
cite the Apostle Paul, wherein creation itself is taken up into union with 
God. When personal beings are present, therefore, creation's freedom 
and integrity depend on God's so responding to sinful rebellion that cre-
ation achieves that end for which God creates a semi-autonomous part-
ner in the first place. Therefore, from the perspective of creation's final 
goal, when personal beings abuse their gift of freedom through sin, they 
compromise the "integrity" of creation by placing its end in peril. The 
divine response to sin in the form of miraculous activity therefore does 
not constitute an "adjustment" to creation that thereby spoils creation's 
integrity, nor an internal contradiction in the divine will, but rather an 
answer to what has become of creation in light of sin. To put the point 
another way, miracles do not constitute an adjustment to creation, but 
an aspect of what the Apostle Paul calls the "new" creation. Indeed, that 
a miracle violates natural law is itself a sign indicating the depths to 
which sin spoils the integrity of the created order, for in the wake of sin, 
God re-creates that order to its very roots, all the way down to the natur-
allaws that for so long had operated without interference. 
I conclude therefore that, properly qualified, the belief that God acts 
in the world occasionally by means of violating natural laws is accept-
able from the perspective of the practice of science. Furthermore, at least 
tentatively I conclude that the belief is theologically acceptable as well, 
at least in light of the preceding theological reflection on the relationship 
between miracles, human sin, and the ultimate goal of creation. I have 
not yet addressed all of Polkinghorne's objections to this notion insofar 
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as I have not evaluated his discussion of the problem of evil. I will delay 
doing so until examining the details of his model for divine action. 
Based on the preceding discussion, I can say, however, that I do not find 
Polkinghorne's model for divine action compelling simply insofar as it 
allows for God to act in the world without violating natural laws. I now 
turn to the specifics of the model itself. 
Vi 
Pol king horne claims that special divine activity would violate the 
integrity of creation if the world were a deterministic mechanism gov-
erned by the laws of classical physics. For in order for God to act in a 
Newtonian world, God would have to break or suspend the operation of 
natural laws. Polkinghorne views the Newtonian world as a "closed" 
and "rigid" structure wherein at any given time all events are pre-deter-
mined to occur by the laws of nature and the state of the universe at any 
given time in the past. The Newtonian world is therefore not "open" to 
special divine activity of a non-invasive sort - for any such activity 
would entail God's tampering with some deterministic law or laws in 
order to bring about what otherwise would not have occurred had this 
law or these laws been in force. 
Two comments are in order here. First, ironically enough, Newton 
and other mechanistic philosophers saw in their mechanical philosophy 
precisely a way to understand how God might be active in the world. 
For these mechanistic philosophers saw the Aristotelian world as a world 
closed to divine action in virtue of natural substances exercising their 
causal powers in a way they thought detracts from divine sovereignty. 
Occasionally, some of these natural philosophers even opted for a vol-
untarist understanding of the laws of Nature, according to which natur-
allaws simply specify how God usually acts. They would not then have 
the kind of autonomy that Polkinghorne envisions the laws of classical 
mechanics having. Polkinghorne would probably not find compelling, 
however, such an understanding of a law of nature, first, because it 
would give insufficient significance to the world as an "other" with 
which God relates, and second, because the scientist on this view would 
not be getting at the underlying structure of God's "other" so much as 
understanding the divine will- how God usually acts.1S 
My second comment is that Polkinghorne apparently rejects a possi-
bility that was very much a live option for Isaac Newton himself, name-
ly, that God's special action be through the operation of (deterministic) 
natural laws. For example, Newton considered the possibility that God 
might "arrange for" the appearance of comets at propitious moments in 
order to preserve the stability of the solar system, adjustments that 
would not require any laws of mechanics to be broken. Indeed, I believe 
that Polkinghorne designed his model in order to devise an alternative 
to such a notion, perhaps because it fails to give sufficient significance to 
the world as God's "other" with a freedom to "go its own way." The 
notion of "special providence" as "arrangement" and especially "pre-
arrangement" is too manipulative, a notion of providence unworthy of 
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the respect God has for God's "other." Polkinghorne's model thus pro-
vides an alternative to God's special activity violating natural laws on 
the one hand, and requiring "arrangement" or "pre-arrangement" on 
the other. 
We have seen how Polkinghorne argues that God could exploit the 
indeterministic openness of chaotic systems in order to act in the world 
without need for "pre-arrangement" or miraculous intervention. My 
first objection to this model of divine action is that it is by no means clear 
that chaotic systems are indeterministic. Indeed, the standard analysis of 
them has it that they are deterministic, but in a manner which leaves 
them exquisitely sensitive to external fluctuations on the one hand, and 
on the other, impossible to predict over the long term based on any rea-
sonable knowledge of their state at any time "t." In order to argue that 
they are indeterministic, the case has to be made for their being qualita-
tively different from other classical systems that do not show this sensi-
tivity. I do not think this case has been made, although there are inter-
esting philosophical questions here, the most important being, how does 
one adjudicate a dispute over the kind of causality - deterministic or 
indeterministic - occurring in a dynamical system? To discuss these 
issues in detail would take us too far afield.16 
Questions about indeterminism aside, however, the chief problem 
with the model follows from the fact that as "emergent," a downwardly-
acting causal power is embodied in the system out of whose micro-
structure the power emerges. By "embodied" I mean that the causal 
power is ontologically dependent on (i.e., is sustained by) the very 
micro-structure upon which it acts. Indeed, it is through this very 
dependence that the emergent power gains access to lower ontological 
levels in order to effect change there without "miraculously interven-
ing," as it were, in the processes occurring at these levels. Hence, I argue 
that for Polkinghorne's model to "work" as a model of God's action in 
the world, God would have to be emergent from and thereby embodied 
in the world, a relationship between God and the world that 
Polkinghorne rightly rejects as incompatible with the Christian doctrine 
of creationY 
Another British scientist-theologian, Arthur Peacocke, has developed 
an alternative model that, while exploiting the concept of downward 
causation, does not entail that God is ontologically dependent on the 
world. According to this model, rather than acting downwardly in the 
world, God interacts with the state-of-the-universe-as-a-whole (SOTU-
AA W). The SOTUAA W is the most all-encompassing state possible, one 
that Peacocke envisions as emerging from the interactions between enti-
ties at every ontological level in the universe. As emergent, this wholistic 
state exerts downward causal influence throughout the universe at all 
ontological levels. God interacts with this universal wholistic state in 
such a way that the SOTUAA W in turn exerts its downward causal 
influence in order to bring about those states of affairs God desires. 
Although the model thus avoids any ontological dependence of God on 
the world, it fails to accomplish its primary task of suggesting how God 
acts in the world without intervening in the operation of natural laws. 
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For it is difficult to see how God might interact with the SOTUAA W 
without somehow interfering with the laws governing this universal, 
wholistic state: God would act "on" the world in this case rather than 
"in" it. Therefore, if one is willing to admit that God can intervene here 
at this upper-most level in the universe, I do not see why one should 
object to divine intervention at any other ontological level. The introduc-
tion of downward causation here is therefore superfluous.18 
To summarize the argument to this point, Polkinghorne's model for 
divine action aims to suggest how God might act in special ways in the 
world without violating natural laws. I have argued that his model 
either entails that God is ontologically dependent on the world, or if 
constructed along the lines Arthur Peacocke suggests, fails to show how 
God's special activity does not interfere with natural laws. I pass then to 
consider one of the most important aims for Polkinghorne's model of 
divine action. That is, in response to the problem of evil, the model 
should suggest how God's activity in the world is constrained, with the 
result that God cannot act in all situations and circumstances in order to 
prevent or otherwise lessen the impact of evil. For if God acts down-
wardly in the world, then God cannot accomplish all that God could 
accomplish if God directly intervened in the world. 
Like many, I think the problem of evil is the most serious problem 
confronting the theologian pondering God's action in the world, and 
therefore I am open to suggestions from any quarter which might 
address this problem. I do not believe, however, that Polkinghorne's 
model for divine action helps in this respect. 
First, the success of his proposal regarding the problem of evil can be 
no stronger than the plausibility of his model for divine action. I have 
already indicated why I think this model fails to accomplish its first pri-
mary task: to suggest how God is specially active in the world without 
interfering with natural laws. 
Second, although the model provides for constraints on divine activi-
ty, it cannot specify how the mechanism for divine agency restricts what 
God can accomplish in the world in any given situation, not even in gen-
eral terms. Hence, on the basis of the model, one can only say that God is 
constrained by the mechanism of divine action in the world, but one can-
not specify how God is so constrained in any given instance. Where does 
this put us regarding the problem of evil? I submit, not significantly 
beyond where we were before developing the model. For it must already 
be supposed that there were some constraints on God's activity, namely, 
God's goodness, God's wisdom, and God's desire to bring all human 
beings freely into union with Godself - and in no specific case can it be 
understood how these constraints limit God's activity. It is not clear to 
me therefore how the claim that God is constrained by the mechanism of 
God's agency helps any further to reduce the force of the problem of evil. 
VII 
I close by reflecting on the most fundamental issue at hand, that of 
specifying, if possible, the "causal joint" between God and the world. 
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Polkinghorne argues that the joint depends on certain physical conditions 
obtaining in the world, namely, that there exist "flexible" indeterministic 
processes in which God can maneuver, as it were. Is this a promising 
way to approach the problem of special divine action? Polkinghorne has 
repeatedly denied that indeterministic processes constitute "gaps" in the 
scientific account of the world, at least in the nineteenth-century sense of 
the concept. I agree: the model does not require that a given phenome-
non like biological adaptation remain scientifically inexplicable. 
However, note that his model is quite dependent on there being indeter-
ministic processes, especially macroscopic ones. Hence, although no sci-
entific discovery could in this case undermine his model in the way that 
Darwin's theory undermined special creation, any discovery or theoreti-
cal development that suggested that chaotic systems, or even quantum 
systems, are not indeterministic would at very least count against his 
model. This seems to me an unhealthy, even unacceptable, relationship 
between science and theology, for in this case a scientific discovery 
could cast doubt on whether in principle God can act in the world.19 
The way for Polkinghorne to avoid this consequence would be to 
reject the very idea of constructing a model of special divine action that 
specifies the physical conditions that must obtain if God is to act in the 
world. The alternative is to recognize that because the divine act of cre-
ation itself is not a physical act, i.e., one that presupposes pre-existing 
material, but rather a bringing forth ex nihilo of all that exists outside of 
God, then the causal joint between God and the world is metaphysical in 
nature, located "behind" or "under" the physical world open to scientif-
ic investigation. One could then assert that God's action in the world is 
analogous to wholistic downward action within chaotic systems - if 
indeed there exists such a mode of causation - without further claiming 
that divine action actually exploits physical indeterminism. The analogy 
would thereby suggest what the relationship between God and the 
world is "like," but only given the fundamental metaphysical proviso -
derived from the doctrine of creaton ex nilzilo - that God's being and 
God's power to act do not depend on or derive from the world. It is this 
metaphysical proviso that strictly limits how this or any other analogy 
for divine action can be exploited by, for example, ruling out the search 
for the physical mode of causation that divine action exploits. Despite 
this limitation, though, the analogy under consideration here does do 
some work, for it suggests that the causal joint between God and world, 
albeit "behind" or "under" the physical world and hence not physical in 
nature, is "more like" the causal joint between a wholistic, downwardly 
active causal power and its sustaining microstructure than is the causal 
joint between, for example, two billiard balls colliding with each other. 
The analogy thus helps us better to grasp the metaphysical relationship 
between the Creator and the creation in which the Creator acts by illus-
trating something of what is meant by "non-invasive divine activity," 
although that relationship itself is in principle beyond the power of the 
natural sciences to locate or investigate. 2') 
By using what I am calling the "metaphysical proviso" to limit how 
the analogy between divine action and downward causation is used, one 
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builds a stronger, and I believer more proper buffer between scientific 
discovery and the credibility of the fundamental religious belief that 
God acts in the world. For I believe that the claim that God transcends 
the world as its creator renders highly suspect attempts like 
Polkinghorne's to argue that God must exploit a built-in physical feature 
of the world in order to act in the world. Hence, no discovery about the 
mode of causation obtaining in a given kind of physical system can put 
belief in divine action at risk. This places the burden of the debate about 
divine action squarely where it ought to rest, on the struggle to interpret 
the human experience of death and rebirth that Christians understand in 
terms of the God who creates and who saves.21 
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by making the first, and perhaps the second of the following two claims: (1) 
if God is to act in the world, macroscopic indeterministic physical systems of 
some sort must exist (weaker claim); and (2) if God acts in the world, God 
does so specifically through "chaotic" systems, which must therefore be 
indeterministic (stronger claim). If Polkinghorne in fact is only making the 
weaker claim, his position puts theology far less at risk than if he is asserting 
both claims. Although for the position I sketch below, I reject both claims, I 
am far less certain that theologians ought in principle to avoid ones of the 
weaker sort. My uncertainty turns on my intuition that fruitful speculation 
on human action might draw on speculation that macroscopic indeterminism 
obtains in the human brain and nervous system (as I argue in my disserta-
tion, Divine Action and Indeterminism, Chapter 6 - "Freedom, Action, and 
Downward Causation"). On the whole, however, I am inclined to argue that 
because human beings are embodied (perhaps necessarily so), it is appropri-
ate to seek physical prerequisites for free human action, whereas, as I argue 
immediately below, the fundamental ontological distinction between the 
Creator and creation renders this kind of speculation in the case of divine 
action highly suspect. 
20. My argument here, I believe, is broadly consistent with Thomas 
Aquinas' reflection on "divine action," given that for Aquinas God's action 
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is essentially always that of creator (that of bestowing esse, or being). See 
David B. Burrell, C.S.c., Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), especially pp. 67-73. 
21. My thanks go to William Wainwright and an anonymous referee 
for their critical comments on this paper. A different version of this paper 
was presented at Valparaiso University in 1993, and at the Eastern Meeting 
of the Society of Christian Philosophers in 1995. 
